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Proponents of the “China Model” suggest that autocracies, particularly in East Asia, 
reward competence more than democracies. However, a competing literature argues that 
autocracies are less likely to reward competence because autocrats fear that competent 
officials could challenge for power. We argue that autocracies do not fear technical 
competence; they fear political competence. As such, autocracies may promote ministers 
with technical competence but punish the politically competent. Democracies, by contrast, 
place a premium on political competence when deciding whom to promote. We provide 
the first test of this theory on how ministerial behavior is rewarded using a unique dataset 
of political performance and promotions in nine East Asian countries. Our findings show 
that autocracies promote officials with technical competence as long as the ministers limit 
their political behavior. In democracies, parliamentary and presidential democracies 
promote those displaying political competence. 
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Proponents of the “China Model” suggest that autocracies are more likely to reward 
competent ministers and civil servants for promotion than democracies (Bell, 2015). This 
argument is particularly prevalent in East Asia, where some identify an “East Asian” 
model that marries a strong state and administrative competence (Gilley, 2014; Zakaria & 
Lee, 1994). At the same time, a competing literature argues that autocracies should be 
less likely to reward competence than democracies. These authors suggest that autocrats, 
fearful of political challenges from competent subordinates, will elevate incompetent 
lackeys to important positions of power (Egorov & Sonin, 2011; Ezrow & Frantz, 2011; 
Zakharov, 2016). As such, autocracies should incentivize mediocrity.   
Adjudicating between these views has profound stakes for recent debates over the 
relative merits of democracy versus autocracy in delivering economic performance and 
good governance. Reprising concerns about the Soviet Union’s early economic successes 
(Hoover, 1957, cited in Krugman, 1994), China’s economic growth and emerging global 
status have led some to question whether it has cracked the code of combining high 
quality governance with limited political participation. While few have offered an 
unqualified endorsement of East Asian autocracies as an alternative model,1 an increasing 
wave of scholarship suggests that countries like Singapore and China have identified 
ways to improve government performance without opening themselves to competitive 
politics. These scholars cite specific institutional innovations such as governance reforms 
(Stromseth, Malesky, & Gueorguiev, 2017), elections (Manion, 2017), and cadre 
evaluation schemes (Landry, Lu, & Duan, Forthcoming; Li & Zhou, 2005; Whiting, 
2004). Meritocratic performance incentives are one of these theorized mechanisms (Bell, 
2015). Although a number of scholars cast doubt on the efficacy of the model (Ortmann, 
                                                     
1 For the most bullish on the sustainability of the China Model, see Breslin (2011) and Bell (2015).  
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2012; Serrato, Wang, & Zhang, 2017), the stakes are such that prominent journals have 
featured symposia on the question.2  
Despite the robust theoretical debate, surprisingly little empirical work compares 
how competence is rewarded across democracies and autocracies.3 The literature, which 
mostly focuses on appointments, is largely bifurcated into separate research on 
democracies and autocracies. The democratic literature broadly examines the role of 
gender, institutions, and political affiliation in ministerial selection and promotions in 
parliamentary and presidential democracies (e.g., Claveria & Verge, 2015; Escobar-
Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Lee & Park, 2018).4 A related literature examines 
the role of political versus technical qualities in the staffing of bureaucracies. This 
research suggests that political affiliation and technical expertise are positively linked 
with promotion, although the relative importance of technical versus political qualities 
may vary according to the strength of the opposition (Grzymala-Busse, 2007), 
alternations in power (Meyer-Sahling & Veen, 2012), or the strength of the leader vis-à-
vis her own coalition (Geddes, 1994). 
Similarly, a burgeoning empirical research agenda in autocracies assesses the 
importance of competence, performance, and loyalty on promotions in autocracies (Jia, 
Kudamatsu, & Seim, 2015; Landry, Lu, & Duan, Forthcoming; Li & Zhou, 2005; Reuter 
& Robertson, 2012; Shih, Adolph, & Liu, 2012). Building on previous work from the 
Soviet Union (Markevich & Zhuravskaya, 2011; Willerton, 1992), while the voluminous 
                                                     
2 See: Perspectives on Politics. 2016. “What Exactly is the Chinese Ideal.” 14(1): 141-161; Foreign Policy. 
2015. “Is the China Model Better than Democracy?” October 19, 2015.  
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/19/china-democracy-theory-communist-party-politics-model/.   
3 Some research does look at whether democracies can select competent officials (Dal Bo, et al., 2017), but 
no work has compared patterns of ministerial promotions across the systems.  
4 In particular, there is a vast literature on ministerial appointments in parliamentary studies so we only list 
a few of them here.  
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literature on China research is divided over whether loyalty or competence drives 
promotions, this literature generally suggests that both play a role. Similar to the 
literature on democracy, this research also questions whether regime type and 
competitiveness matter in autocracy, with some suggesting that similar to democracies, 
when autocrats face stronger competition, they are more likely to rely on political 
considerations rather than technical expertise (Buckley & Reuter, 2019; Reuter & 
Robertson, 2012). In particular, the importance of competitiveness is possibly why post-
communist Russia seems to reward competence to a lesser degree than is the case in 
China or even in the Soviet Union (Buckley & Reuter, 2019). 
Because of this separation in the research agenda, the divergent approaches lead 
to complications in comparing how ministers are evaluated in democracies and 
autocracies. In particular, the definition of competence varies between literatures. Due to 
the varied conceptualizations of competence used in the theoretical and empirical 
literature, it is difficult to assess clearly what the “competence-loyalty” (Egorov & Sonin, 
2011; Zakharov, 2016) tradeoff in an autocracy is likely to be and to meaningfully 
evaluate the notion that autocracies systematically reward more competent ministers than 
democracies. Although there is a compelling study that compares across regimes and 
examines the education background of leaders (Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011), this 
study does not consider political performance or assess patterns of promotion within the 
regime.  
In this article, to develop predictions for promotions in democracies and 
autocracies, we distinguish between technical competence and political competence. 
Technical competence, we argue, corresponds to the Weberian conceptualization of the 
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ideal civil servant, who knows how to propose and execute a correct policy. However, 
while technically competent bureaucrats are able to identify the best policy, they are not 
necessarily adept at drawing public attention to themselves and the policies they promote. 
Such ability to generate public attention is critical for winning support for policies and 
pressuring potentially resistant legislators.5 Consistent with Weber (1958), we contend 
that the ability to generate public attention is a crucial component of political competence. 
More importantly for this article, as we argue below, it is precisely this component of 
political competence that autocrats will fear and democratic leaders will desire. While 
political competence also includes other qualities such as the ability to claim credit and 
generate goodwill amongst colleagues, the publicity-generating component of political 
competence is one that autocrats particularly fear in their deputies.    
We use this distinction to make a series of predictions regarding how ministers 
are evaluated in democracies and autocracies. Building on Gueorguiev and Schuler 
(2016) and consistent with the proponents of autocratic meritocracy, we argue that 
autocrats will value technical competence. However, consistent with theoretical and 
empirical research on promotions, autocrats will also be less likely to promote based on 
political competence (i.e. the ability to attract attention). Furthermore, because the 
primary threat of the politically competent is to depose leaders, this penalty should only 
apply to those climbing to the highest echelons of power – precisely the positions that 
will offer the politically competent a platform to depose the leader. By contrast, in 
democracies, attracting attention through political competence is critical. Because parties 
and political leaders in democratic polities depend on public opinion to win elections and 
                                                     
5 As we further discuss below, political performance may not lead to higher approval or popularity, but it 
should lead to greater intensity of support for the individual.  
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pass policies, political competence will be valued and should matter for all types of 
ministries, including the most prestigious posts. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the theory is plausible. Studies from South Korea 
suggest that the types of ministerial backgrounds valued in the government changed after 
the 1988 democratization  (Hahm, Jung, & Lee, 2013). Prior to 1988, the military-backed 
governments relied more heavily on external experts to staff the ministries. However, 
within the democratic governments after transition, appointments of ministers with 
political skills, such as legislators, play a greater role. 6  Anecdotal evidence from 
Indonesia is also consistent with our proposition. During the era of Suharto’s dictatorship, 
he relied heavily on technocrats in the form of the so-called “Berkeley Mafia” of 
economists as well as engineers, who were brought on to promote high-tech industry 
(Amir, 2008). However, after the democratic transition in 1999, Indonesian cabinets have 
been dominated by party leaders and high-profile politicians (Slater, 2018). One finds 
similar dynamics in Taiwan and the Philippines pre- and post-transition to democracy.7  
To more systematically test this intuition, we rely on an original dataset of 994 
government ministers in East Asia since 2005. To test our theory, we examine how 
ministers are promoted to senior cabinet positions after their initial appointment to the 
                                                     
6 Unfortunately, they do not examine the role of the minister’s political competence in different levels of 
portfolios. 
7 While cabinet appointees were mostly either technocrats or loyalists to Marcos from his inner circle 
during the dictatorship, the Aquino cabinet that formed after transition was composed of representatives 
from a variety of political persuasions (Timberman, 2015). Similarly in Taiwan, cabinet leadership 
positions tended to be occupied by party members with technocratic backgrounds, such as Yen Chia-kan, 
for decades of single-party dictatorship. However, after democratization, these positions increasingly go to 
factional leaders or high-profile politicians, as exemplified by the Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen 
governments (Fell, 2011). 
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cabinet. 8  Of central importance to this article, we construct an original measure of 
political competence using a minister’s public profile based on Google Trends searches 
(i.e. the number of times citizens from a given country searched for that minister).9 After 
validating our measure, the results of several proportional-hazards models show support 
for our theory. We find that in democracies and autocracies ministers with greater 
political performance are more likely to win promotion to higher cabinet posts. However, 
in autocracies, this only holds true for selection to lower prestige posts. Politically 
competent ministers do not win promotion to the most prestigious positions. In 
democracies, high political competence is a benefit at all levels. Additionally, consistent 
with the “China Model” thesis, candidates with higher levels of education are more likely 
to be promoted in autocracies. In democracies, however, political competence outweighs 
technical competence in promotions.  
We conclude with discussion of the implications of our findings. Our theory and 
findings do not support a normative argument for the relative benefits of the authoritarian 
model of bureaucratic management. Indeed, political theory suggests competing 
perspectives, with the “China Model” advocates arguing for technocratic meritocracy on 
one hand and Weber arguing for political competence on the other. The primary aim of 
this article is more positivistic. We simply seek to establish whether the assumption that 
autocracies are more likely to incentivize technical performance than democracies is true. 
Our findings suggest that for high prestige cabinet posts, the ability to attract attention is 
incentivized in democracies but not autocracies. As we discuss in the conclusion, whether 
                                                     
8 Of course, our argument also carries implications for appointments as well as promotions. Unfortunately 
we lack data on all the potential candidates considered for positions but did not receive the posts. In the 
article, we discuss the implications this holds for our findings and analysis.  
9 For China, where Google is not popular, we rely on Baidu searches.  
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this is desirable depends on additional factors outside the scope of this article. While Bell 
argues for Chinese or Singaporean style meritocracy, Weber cautions that rule by 
technocrats will lead to a loss of support for policies that may be desirable.  
 
The Concept of Competence in Democracies and Autocracies 
In this section, we first revisit the variety of ways in which competence is conceived in 
order to defend and distinguish our notion of political and technical competence. We then 
discuss how this notion is applied specifically to the question of ministerial performance 
and how it is distinguished from other criteria that could factor into political leaders’ 
evaluation of ministers. This distinction is important for both the conceptual and practical 
concerns of this article, which are further discussed below.  
 Most of the literature on competence comes from research on elections and 
appointments. Within research on elected officials, Stokes (1963) emphasizes the notion 
that some politicians might be higher quality by distinguishing a politician’s “valence” 
from her “positions.” Valence criteria are those that are viewed positively or negatively 
by the electorate regardless of political orientation. A politician’s competence is a classic 
“valence” trait, where some voters presumably would prefer a competent to an 
incompetent politician.10 A more recent formal literature assesses the impact of electoral 
competition on the competence of candidates, particularly legislators, for office. This 
research suggests that when elections are more competitive, political parties are more 
likely to nominate competent, or high-quality candidates for those seats (Galasso & 
Nannicini, 2011, 2017; Jacobson, 1989; Mattozzi & Merlo, 2015). 
                                                     
10 It is also possible that some voters may see incompetence as a positive quality as it signals that the 
politician is not an elite and therefore closer to citizens.  
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Empirical tests of these models use several operationalizations of competence 
almost interchangeably. Some use education as a measure of quality (Galasso & 
Nannicini, 2017), under the logic that voters will prefer educated candidates because they 
may be more likely to enact high-quality policies or will be more public-spirited (Besley 
& Reynal-Querol, 2011). Others use previous elected experience, under the notion that 
this is an objective proxy for whether a candidate has features that voters value (Galasso 
& Nannicini, 2017; Jacobson, 1989). Some others use a candidate’s income, with the 
argument that income demonstrates an individual’s “market success and ability” (Galasso 
& Nannicini, 2011, p. 79).  
In contrast to research on elected officials, research on ministerial appointments in 
democracies distinguishes between political experience and technical competence. 
Camerlo and Perez-Linan (2015a) exemplify the dominant approach, arguing that 
presidents seek to maximize three traits: political support, technical skills, and loyalty. 
Alexiadou (2015) similarly distinguishes three types of ministers that represent three 
traits prime ministers attempt to balance in parliamentary democracies: partisans, 
ideologues, and loyalists. In terms of operationalization, political skills are measured by 
whether or not the minister has party affiliation or parliamentary experience (Amorim 
Neto, 2006; Lee, 2018a; Pekkanen, Nyblade, & Krauss, 2006). Technical skills are 
measured by a minister’s professional background or educational level (Camerlo & 
Perez-Linan, 2015a; Lee, 2019). Loyalty is measured by the absence of a political or 
professional background (Camerlo & Perez-Linan, 2015a).11 Therefore, in contrast to the 
                                                     
11 Other research in the East Asian context measures whether a minister shares the same place of origin 
with the chief executive as a measure of the minister’s loyalty (Lee, 2018b).  
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concept of competence in electoral candidates, the literature on ministerial appointments 
in democracies delinks political and technical skills.   
The literature on promotions in autocracies uses still different measures to 
identify quality or competent candidates for promotions to elected, ministerial, or other 
political positions. In this literature, the quality of the minister in question varies 
considerably depending on the author. One influential account of promotions in 
autocracies, positing the “competence-loyalty” tradeoff, considers competence as the 
ability to identify a coup attempt against an autocrat (Egorov & Sonin, 2011; Ezrow & 
Frantz, 2011; Zakharov, 2016). Other research on promotions in China and Russia 
operationalizes performance by the ability to generate growth within a province or to 
increase tax revenue (Jia, Kudamatsu, & Seim, 2015; Landry, Lu, & Duan, Forthcoming; 
Li & Zhou, 2005; Reuter & Robertson, 2012). Outside of the promotions literature, there 
are still other definitions of competence used. Crabtree, Kern, and Siegel (2018), for 
example, suggest that dictators want officials with “disposition competence,” which they 
define as the ability to behave viciously and without scruples.  
Given the widely differing conceptualizations of competence, we clarify what we 
mean by competence in order to help us distinguish patterns of ministerial promotion 
behavior across democracies and autocracies. Consistent with research on ministerial 
appointments in democracies, we argue that political competence is the ability to build a 
coalition of support among colleagues or the public for oneself, one’s party, or a policy. 
Technical competence, on the other hand, involves the ability to identify the correct 
policies within a specific policy domain. With this conceptualization, we can see the 
basis of the “reds versus experts” debate in autocracies (Buckley & Reuter, 2019; Meyer-
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Sahling & Veen, 2012). The reason why the chief executive might choose a minister for 
political reasons is to build support among one’s own parties or potential coalition 
partners. A technocrat is a luxury that only strong leaders can afford. In using this 
conceptualization, we therefore clearly see political competence as an individual-level 
valence trait, and not a mere function of one’s party label. That is, party membership may 
be a measure of loyalty or alliance, but not a measure of political competence.12  
In terms of our concepts, the measure of technical competence we use below fits 
existing research. In measuring political competence, however, we concentrate on a 
particular component of the concept – the ability to attract attention – for theoretical and 
measurement reasons. Although it is not the sole component of political competence, the 
ability to attract attention to oneself is a fundamental element of political competence. 
Indeed, as Mayhew (1974) highlights, advertising, credit claiming, and position taking 
are key weapons that a politician uses to win elections. The ability to attract attention is 
central to an official winning public support, which can be useful for putting pressure on 
other politicians to support a given policy proposal. Nonetheless, we acknowledge that 
ours is a potentially narrow operationalization of political competence. Indeed, politically 
competent officials may be able to attract resources and mobilize coalitions in ways that 
do not attract public attention. Although challenging to measure, future work could assess 
how these less public forms of political competence impact promotion prospects.13  
Although such a support base might spark a countervailing base of opposition, 
and thus lead the official to be polarizing and dilute the aggregate approval for that 
official, a loyal base of personal support can be still useful for ministers. A high intensity 
                                                     
12 Although party membership is not how we measure political competence, we control for this in our tests. 
13 We suspect that if autocrats could detect coalition building among ministers, they may seek to punish 
them for precisely the same reasons that we discuss below with regards to attention seeking behavior.  
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support base may give ministers’ leverage, which can help in influencing copartisans in 
the legislature. Indeed, while this support base may not translate into aggregate popularity, 
although it often does, the intensity and concentration of the support affords them greater 
independence from the party collective. As we discuss in the next section, democratic 
leaders are more likely to indulge such ministers because of their potential to deliver 
votes (Tavits, 2009), whereas such ministers may be punished in autocracies due to their 
ability to upset internal power sharing dynamics (Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016).  
Our conceptualizations of political and technical competence are also consistent 
with Weber’s notion of civil servants versus politicians (Weber, 1958). Civil servants, he 
notes, are able to identify the correct policies. Politicians, however, can win support for 
certain policies through the political skill of rhetoric. 14  Legal expertise, he argues, 
particularly endows politicians with such oratorical skills, which will enable ministers to 
make a public case for themselves and the policies they promote.  
Finally, before proceeding, we should emphasize that technical competence and 
political competence are conceptually independent. A minister can be a brilliant expert 
within a field of economics without having the ability or inclination to mobilize a 
personal base of support. Similarly, a minister can gain a reputation as an ingenious 
minister without actually having a great deal of technical expertise herself. The degree to 
which politicians gain a reputation will depend on their ability to claim credit, an 
inherently political skill (Mayhew, 1974). To conclude our discussion of key concepts, in 
this study we consider technical competence the ability to identify beneficial policies, 
while political competence is the ability to attract attention to oneself.  
                                                     
14 We use political skills and political competence interchangeably. A politician with strong political skills, 




Theory and Hypotheses 
By identifying what we mean by competence, we can now ask the question: How will 
democracies and autocracies differ in rewarding ministers with political or technical 
competence through the potential carrot of promotion to senior cabinet positions?  
 In democracies and autocracies, chief executives have an incentive to maximize 
technical and political skills in ministerial and bureaucratic appointments. Both 
democracies and autocracies should have a desire to promote officials with technical 
skills in order to ensure that policies are well devised and implemented. With regard to 
political skills, democracies need political skills amongst ministers in order to build 
coalitions and electoral support (Geddes, 1994), but even autocrats who may be less 
concerned with elections and coalitions should also desire political competence in order 
to ensure that the regime is minimally popular and able to win support for its policies 
(Crabtree, Kern, & Siegel, 2018; Dimitrov, 2009; Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016; Reuter & 
Robertson, 2012). Therefore, both autocracies and democracies should prefer to 
promoting technically and politically competent officials.  
 The key difference between democracies and autocracies is the electoral 
environment. In both democracies and autocracies, chief executives not only value policy 
cohesion and wish to minimize agency loss when choosing cabinet ministers (Lee, 2019; 
Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015; Schuler, 2018; Strom, 2000) but also want to 
ensure that policies are enacted skillfully, such that ministers achieve the leaders’ goals 
and do not provoke a public backlash. However, chief executives in democracies face 
greater electoral pressure, which should lead to the following effects. First, democratic 
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leaders must be cognizant of the need to win electoral support. In this sense, the political 
competence of ministers can be an asset. Where chief executives lack popularity within 
their own base, they may reach out to politically competent officials to bolster the 
credibility of the government (Camerlo & Perez-Linan, 2015a, 2015b; Lee, 2018a; Ono, 
2012). Consistent with Tavits (2009), chief executives may even tolerate maverick 
copartisan ministers if the ministers have a strong local support base, in order to win 
votes loyal to those ministers.  
Second, the need for electoral support will impact the degree to which politically 
competent behavior is necessary to achieve policy outcomes. Research from democracies 
suggests that political skills are important to maintain support from coalition partners in 
the legislature or to advance a particular political agenda (Alexiadou, 2015; Amorim 
Neto, 2006; Chaisty, Cheeseman, & Power, 2014; Chaisty & Chernykh, 2017; Lee, 
2018a). Commonly in parliamentary and presidential systems, well-crafted proposals 
require some degree of public support to become policy (Centeno & Silva, 1998). 
Although differences in the relative importance of political and technical skills exist 
between parliamentary and presidential systems – notably, presidential systems should be 
freer to select non-partisan, technocratic ministers (Amorim Neto, 2006; Lee, 2018a) – 
presidential democracies still need politically competent ministers who can help to build 
and maintain a coalition in order to protect the president and pass her agenda. A minister 
capable of attracting attention may be able to mobilize support, at least within the 
minister’s party, for the government.  
This generates two reasons why chief executives may incentivize the ability to 
generate attention in democracies – the need to win elections and the necessity to secure 
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support for policies. To achieve their goals by maximizing the effects of political 
competence, democratic leaders will therefore promote ministers with the ability to 
generate attention to more powerful cabinet posts. Thus, we propose the first hypothesis 
of our study: 
Hypothesis 1: In democracies, ministers with higher political competence are 
more likely to win promotion.  
 
 
 In terms of technical competence, democracies obviously would prefer technically 
competent to incompetent ministers. However, there are two important factors that will 
limit the degree to which democracies incentivize the promotion of technical 
competence: first, a potential trade-off in minister choices and second, the relatively short 
time horizon of democratic political leaders. Typically, chief executives in democracies 
seek to obtain political and technical competence through political appointments. 
However, competing incentives should exist when choosing ministers, because chief 
executives are not only restrained by the scarcity of top executive posts but also 
encounter delegation problems where appointees differ in the capability and incentive to 
achieve the chief executive’s aim (Camerlo & Perez-Linan, 2015a; Huber & Martinez-
Gallardo, 2012; Lee, 2018a; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015).15  
 Moreover, in some countries, such as the Philippines and South Korea, presidents 
are only allowed to serve for a single term. In parliamentary systems, such as Japan, 
while the ruling party may rule for a longer period of time, the time in office for any 
                                                     
15  In presidential democracies, for example, the choice of party-affiliated ministers can increase the 
cabinet’s political influence but may lead to agency loss due to divergent policy interests between the 
president and her party, the two competing principals of the ministers. In contrast, nonpartisan ministers are 
generally perceived as loyalists with technocratic backgrounds but lack political leverage (Samuels & 
Shugart, 2010). 
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given minister is likely to be short.16 Because any payoffs from technical competence are 
likely to accrue in the long-run, whereas the payoffs to political competence will be 
realized immediately, political performance should receive a higher priority than 
technical performance.17 In sum, we predict that it is a trade-off in minister choices and 
the short time horizon of democratic political leaders that cause democracies to relatively 
discount technical competence in promoting ministers. Therefore, our second hypothesis 
is:  
Hypothesis 2: In democracies, ministers' technical competence will not impact the 
chance of promotion. 
 
 
How will the situation differ in autocracies? Autocracies feature crucial 
distinctions from democracies: As Bell (2015) notes, autocracies have longer time 
horizons than democracies. Therefore, while they need legitimacy based on performance, 
the desire for popularity does not revolve around the electoral calendar. As such, they 
should be more apt to promote based on technical competence that will deliver sustained 
performance, or what others call “performance legitimacy” (Dickson, 2016; Thayer, 
2010). Because autocrats can reap the rewards of longer-run technical competence, they 
should be more likely to promote based on such competence. At the same time, we do 
note that this effect should be most pronounced in party-based autocratic regimes rather 
than in personalist or military regimes. This is because promoting based on technical 
competence or performance requires a bureaucracy in order to manage internal 
                                                     
16 In our sample, the median survival time for Japanese ministers between 2005 and 2016 is 12 months. 
17 Appointments and promotions are certainly intertwined, but promotions – our main outcome of interest – 
are subtly distinct from appointments. While research on appointments in democracies, which recognizes 
the importance of technical competence (Lee, 2018a), is concerned with the partisan composition of 
aggregate cabinets, research on promotions is concerned with the conditions and qualities that lead certain 
ministers to either remain in office or win promotion to a higher office (Blondel, 1991; Camerlo & Perez-
Linan, 2015a). 
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promotions. In China, for example, it is well-known that the communist party relies on 
the Central Organization Committee in order to manage a complex cadre evaluation 
system that is meant to reward high performing officials (Whiting, 2004). From this 
discussion, to conduct an empirical test with our sample composed mostly of party-based 
regimes, we propose the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: In autocracies, ministers with higher technical competence are 
more likely to win promotion.  
 
 
What about political competence in autocracies? Although autocracies face fewer 
electoral pressures, they will still prefer to attracting public attention because this will 
reduce the cost of remaining in power (Dimitrov, 2009; Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016). At 
the same time, in contrast to democracies, ministers displaying the ability to attract 
attention at high levels of government could pose a threat to authoritarian leaders 
(Gueorguiev and Schuler 2016). Ministers who actively bring attention to themselves can 
reduce the power of the other ministers within the collective leadership structure, because 
the high-profile individual can use the threat of their following to force concessions. 
Similarly, in systems featuring “reciprocal accountability,” where lower-level party 
bodies select senior figures (Shirk, 1993), the promotion of politically skillful individuals 
can weaken the role of subordinate bodies. This threat should be felt most keenly in 
powerful ministries, as these are the ministries that will afford politically astute ministers 
the ability to challenge leaders.  
Theoretically, autocratic leaders could seek to incentivize only the right type of 
competence (Crabtree, Kern, & Siegel, 2018). We agree, as long as the competence is not 
correlated with the ability to challenge the autocrat. As this theory suggests, technical 
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competence is not likely to pose a risk. However, with regard to political competence, it 
is more difficult for autocratic leaders to promote a personally well-known minister 
without suffering potential risks that such a minister could replace them. Even if a 
minister displays no ambition, the mere fact of having a personal base of support gives 
that official the opportunity to challenge leaders for power. Anecdotal examples showing 
the danger of high-ranking, politically competent ministers challenging the status quo 
abound. In Malaysia, Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim became a pariah after challenging 
Prime Minister Mohamed Mahathir’s response to the Asian Financial Crisis (Pepinsky, 
2009). Well-known Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung was similarly 
threatening to Vietnam’s Communist Party leadership (Schuler & Ostwald, 2016).18  
For this reason, we predict that autocrats will avoid promoting ministers 
occupying powerful ministries that display political competence. In sum, autocracies 
should promote ministers with greater political competence. However, they will only do 
so if the profiles are not so large that they generate a threat to the regime. Furthermore, 
this effect is likely to apply consistently to all autocratic regime types, because 
personalist, military, and hereditary leaders should all fear the politically competent. This 
discussion leads to the final hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: In autocracies, ministers with higher political competence are more 
likely to win promotion from ministries with lower importance but not from 




Data and Measurement 
                                                     
18 Although not ministers, Bo Xilai in China and Nguyen Ba Thanh in Vietnam also used their political 
skills to threaten the ruling elite in both countries (Gueorguiev & Schuler, 2016).  
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Our tests of these hypotheses rely on data from nine countries in East Asia: Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, the Philippines, China, Vietnam, Malaysia and Singapore.19 
East Asia is a particularly useful region to study our question. First, it features a diversity 
of political institutions. The sample contains five democracies including Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines as well as four autocracies including China, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore. One drawback in this case selection is that each 
authoritarian regime is a party-based regime. As noted in the theory section, we think the 
effect of political competence should apply to all authoritarian regime types, while the 
positive effect of technical competence may be stronger in single-party regimes. 
Therefore, our findings on political competence should generalize, but the findings on 
technical competence might not. With that said, it is important to note that party-based 
autocracies constitute the majority of authoritarian regimes in the modern world 
(Magaloni & Kricheli, 2010). 
The variation between democracies and autocracies allows us to compare 
promotion patterns across regime types. An additional benefit of looking within East Asia 
is that it is a region where the debate over the technocratic “China Model” is central. The 
argument for top-down selection mechanisms dovetails with a long-standing debate over 
the so-called “Asian Values” or “Asian Model of Governance” theses, whereby some 
suggest that East Asians are predisposed to accept restrictions on participation in 
exchange for more competent bureaucratic management (Gilley, 2014; Zakaria & Lee, 
                                                     
19 In terms of the specific countries, we choose the nine countries based on the availability of significant 
search data. For example, East Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and North 
Korea, do not generate enough search traffic on ministers to construct a measure. Within the cases we do 
examine the data come from the CIA Directory of Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign 
Governments and the Political Handbook of the World. Biographical information of ministers was collected 
from Keesing’s Record of World Event, academic publications, government websites, and news reports. 
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1994). If there are “Asian Values,” this should reduce the likelihood that we find any 
difference across regime types, as promotion patterns should be consistent across the 
region. 
 In testing our hypotheses, we first need to operationalize political competence 
versus technical competence. As noted above, our measure of political competence 
focuses on the ability to attract attention. Even using the particular version of political 
competence we adopt in this paper, the concept is inherently difficult to measure. It is 
hard, for example, to assess the degree to which a particular minister is able to win public 
support for policy based on their political power or their compelling oratory. In this 
article, we borrow from Gueorguiev and Schuler (2016) to suggest that a useful proxy for 
political competence is a minister’s public profile, the degree to which an individual is 
well known by the public. Research on democracies demonstrates that name recognition 
translates into political power in terms of winning elections (Kam & Zechmeister, 2013). 
First, the same skills necessary to generate name recognition could also be used to 
generate support for policies. Second, name recognition should also directly lead to the 
greater ability to change policy, which itself is a source of political power. Indeed, as 
Alexiadou (2015) demonstrates, political heavyweights have a greater ability to change 
policy than ideologues or loyalists.  
 The key innovation of our research is to test our argument on an original dataset 
of public profiles based on Google search data. Given that there is no public opinion data 
available for individual ministers in a time-series format, Google Trends is an attractive 
information source to measure ministers’ public profiles. Google Trends is a measure of 
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search volume that is available going back to 2005.20 It has been used by a number of 
scholars to measure public interest in issues as well as to predict electoral outcomes 
(Granka, 2013; Hong, 2016; Mellon, 2014; Reilly, Richey, & Taylor, 2012; Weeks & 
Southwell, 2010). We generate our scores of public profiles for all ministers from the 
nine East Asian countries from 2005 to 2016. Because the measure provided by Google is 
a relative score, we measure each of the search terms (i.e., a minister’s full name) against 
the highest searched political figure in that country between 2005 and 2016. In all, this 
leads to a 23,806 minister-month dataset of 994 ministers across nine countries.  
 However, using Google Trends data as proxies for measures of ministers’ public 
profiles requires a proper validity checking process in order to claim that the trends in 
search data track those in the broader population (Mellon, 2014). In particular, two 
questions must be addressed regarding the patterns of Internet usage: the levels of 
Google’s dominance in Internet search engine markets and the levels of penetration in 
Internet access. In our sample of nine East Asian countries, Google dominates in search 
markets of eight countries except China.21 Since Google search data are not available in 
China, we use search data from Baidu, which has 75 percent market share in China and is 
available since 2011. To make this data consistent with our other countries, we convert 
the search data into a relative scale of 0-100 to make it compatible with Google search 
                                                     
20 The Google data are available from 2004 but only with poor quality in the first year, so 2004 is excluded.   
21 According to StatCounter (2017), between 2009 and 2016, the market share of Google in East Asia is as 
follows: Japan (68%), South Korea (65%), Taiwan (87%), Indonesia (98%), the Philippines (94%), 
Vietnam (93%), Malaysia (96%), and Singapore (95%). 
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data.22 In terms of the levels of penetration in Internet access, they vary across countries, 
but none of the countries in our sample has a penetration level below 50 percent.23  
 The other validity issue is whether the searches correspond to what they are 
assumed to measure, or more generally, whether they have content validity. That is, the 
ministers' search index must measure the salience of particular ministers we observe and 
not other celebrities or sports players with the same names. Looking at the top searches, 
which include the search term of interest, can help to avoid such irrelevant searches.24 
 Another important validity concern is whether the search data reflect public 
interest in the official based on attention she intentionally brings to herself. Our 
conceptualization of a minister’s public profile concerns the degree to which she draws 
attention from the general public, which may grow into a personal base of support for her. 
Our goal is to use Google Trends to track public support for ministers. We thus need to 
distinguish their search index from levels of public interest generated due to unwanted 
attention, affairs, or events, such as scandals. To account for any significant impact of 
negative issues on ministers’ public profiles, other than well-known and familiar cases 
searchable online, we also examined months that were over three standard deviations 
above the mean for each minister and looked for evidence that the spikes were driven by 
scandals. We then limited their impact by creating a dichotomous variable indicating 
                                                     
22 The relative score for each minister is calculated as the number of times searched for an individual 
minister divided by the number of times searched for the highest searched political figure in China between 
2011 and 2016. 
23 The ratio of Internet penetration tends to increase over the time period of our observation. According to 
Internet World Stats, as of December 2016, the Internet penetration ratio in East Asia is: Japan (94%), 
South Korea (93%), Taiwan (88%), Indonesia (51%), the Philippines (56%), China (53%), Vietnam (67%), 
Malaysia (79%), and Singapore (81%) (see http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm). 
24 When there are irrelevant searches, one way to remove them is using a "–"sign in the search string (e.g., 
"Shinzo Abe–scandal"). 
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whether a minister was mentioned in newspaper articles due to scandals or other negative 
issues in that month.25  
Finally, our validity check includes testing whether Google Trends data are good 
proxies for a measure of political competence by comparing with public opinion data 
from legislative elections. Our argument suggests that political competence should lead to 
strong support, but that the support may also be countervailed by strong opposition. 
Therefore, those with political skills may either be genuinely popular or perhaps 
polarizing. Unfortunately, public opinion data are scarce in autocratic contexts. However, 
some evidence from Vietnam bolsters our arguments. Vietnam conducted a vote of 
confidence for the first time in 2013, where legislative delegates were required to express 
their level of confidence in all ministers. Intriguingly, in that vote, the two ministers with 
the highest public profiles in our dataset – Nguyen Tan Dung and Dinh La Thang – also 
featured the highest level of delegates strongly supporting and opposing those ministers 
(Malesky, 2014). Similarly, in democracies there is little public opinion data on ministers. 
However, we randomly choose close SMD (single-member district) elections from recent 
elections in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, and find that winners had an average profile 
of 10.7 compared to 0.04 for those that lost.26  
In terms of technical competence, we operationalize it through levels of education 
(1 for a bachelor’s degree; 2 for a master’s degree; 3 for a doctoral degree) (Camerlo & 
Perez-Linan, 2015a; Lee, 2019). Using education background as a measure of 
                                                     
25 We are of course unable to determine whether we excluded all information reflecting the negative 
dynamics of public interest out of our search data, although it is reasonable to anticipate that the most 
impactful of these are scandals and rumors related to negative issues. 
26  Our sample includes Shiori Yamao (46.6%) versus Junji Suzuki (44.4%) from District 7 in Aichi 
Prefecture in December 2014, Jin Yeong (42.8%) versus Hwang Chun-ja (39.9%) from Yongsan District in 
Seoul City in April 2016, and Yen Kuan-heng (46.7%) versus Chen Shih-kai (43.7%) from Constituency 2 
in Taichung City in January 2016. 
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competence, of course, is not ideal as it may be that those with lower levels of education 
may actually perform better. However, existing research for leaders suggest that 
education levels correspond to better performance (Besley, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 
2011). At the ministerial level, unfortunately measuring performance across portfolios 
within a given country at a single time or even a single portfolio over time is challenging. 
As such, we lack objective measures of technical performance at a given time. However, 
South Korea does provide a unique opportunity to validate our measure, with tests 
confirming a relationship between performance and education.27  
One particular concern with our technical competence measure is whether or not 
the education background corresponds to the career. This possibility creates a complex 
conceptual and modeling problem. Conceptually, some of the positions overlap. For 
example, in the context of Vietnam, positions like the ministry of finance and the 
ministry of planning and investment have overlapping competencies. At higher levels of 
government, such as deputy prime minister or vice presidential positions, the 
competencies are more general. Furthermore, education may provide general knowledge 
applicable to managing bureaucracies regardless of portfolio. As such, it is difficult to 
incorporate the degree to which education matches the position in the full models.28 Yet, 
since the overall composition of the cabinet, not just the promotion patterns, matters for 
the implications of our findings, we examine the correspondence between the education 
background of the minister and their portfolio in each of our cases. Our results show that 
                                                     
27 Using evaluation indicators measuring ministries’ performance issued by the Office for Government 
Policy Coordination in South Korea (http://www.evaluation.go.kr/psec/intro/intro_1_1_3.jsp), we find that 
the higher the education levels of ministers are, the better performance their ministries achieved, holding 
other variables constant. 
28 For example, if some countries select only those with portfolio-specific expertise to a certain portfolio, 
then promotions may not be possible within a given regime. As such, a country with few promotions, 
where all ministers come from within the ministry, may be evidence of a highly technically competent 
cabinet. 
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the difference between matching is not based on how democratic the country is, but 
rather on whether the political system is parliamentary or non-parliamentary. In our three 
parliamentary systems (Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore), the degree of matching is about 
20-25 percent. In our non-parliamentary systems, reflecting the literature, the presidential 
systems of South Korea and Taiwan have the highest levels of matching at 62 and 64 
percent. China and Vietnam are comparable to Indonesia and the Philippines at between 
37 and 49 percent. This suggests that consistent with existing literature, presidential 
systems initially appoint those with expertise more suitable to their portfolios (Lee, 
2018b). However, there are still ample opportunities for promotion, suggesting that once 
selected, even ministers in presidential systems with political skills could win promotion 
to senior cabinet positions. As robustness checks, we account for the possible effects of 
regime type by limiting our sample to non-parliamentary democratic cases in the analysis 
(Appendix Table A2).  
For our other measures, a third component of our theory is that political 
competence should matter differently in autocracies depending on the importance of the 
position. To operationalize the importance of the cabinet position, we borrow from 
research on gender and executive appointments to suggest that all types of ministries are 
not equal in terms of the threat they pose to autocrats. 29  Research from gender and 
cabinet appointments suggests that women are less likely to win “high prestige” 
ministries than male counterparts (Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2005; Lee & 
Park, 2018). High prestige cabinet posts include portfolios, such as finance or national 
defense, which have more power or financial resources. Medium prestige posts control 
                                                     
29 We recognize other classifications of cabinet positions (e.g., Pekkanen, Nyblade, & Krauss, 2006), which 
largely overlap the template we use in this study, particularly for high prestige ministries. 
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some resources but have less power than the high prestige ministries. Low prestige posts 
have less access to rents or power. The distribution of cabinet ministries by prestige type 
is shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Distribution of Cabinet Positions by Prestige Type 








Minister/Coordinating Minister    
Medium Prestige  Agriculture, Forestry, & Food Justice  




Civil Service & Affairs Trade, Industry, & Commerce  
Communications and Information Labor and Manpower  
Construction and Public Works Planning and Development  
Education Political Affairs  
Energy and Natural Resources Religious Affairs  
Environment/Environmental 
Protection 
Land, Infrastructure, & 
Transportation  
Health and Social Welfare Supervision/Audit/Inspection    
Low Prestige  Aging and Birth  Regional and Local Affairs  
Children and Family Reform  
Culture and Heritage Science and Technology  
Consumer Affairs Sports and Tourism  
Displaced Persons & Expatriates Women's Affairs 
  Minority Affairs Youth 
Sources: Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2005, 838) 
 
The differentiation between ministry types has important implications for our 
theory. We suggest that democracies and autocracies should both be likely to promote 
ministers with high levels of political competence. However, in autocracies, political 
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competence will be punished only if it poses a threat to the regime leaders. This means 
that well-known ministers should be less likely to win promotion from high prestige 
ministries, as these are the ministerial positions where the ministers are most likely to 
pose a challenge to the regime leadership. While it is difficult for a minister of health, for 
example, to threaten the interests of the autocratic leadership, a minister of defense or 
finance has a greater ability to mobilize her support base to threaten the autocrat if 
promoted to higher positions, such as top leadership positions. 
 All our models also include a host of biographical information on the ministers, 
such as age (in years), gender (1 if a minister is female and 0 otherwise), and 
parliamentary experience (the length of service as a member of the parliament in years). 
As controls, other than the variable accounting for negative issues (Scandal), we also 
include a dichotomous variable indicating the termination of the government, because 
this may affect both a minister’s public profile and the probability of promotion.30 In 
democracies, government turnover is more frequent, and ministerial promotions are 
therefore subject to party change in government. All our models also include country-
level fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity, such as possible variation in 
degrees of ministerial promotions across East Asian countries. Table 2 shows descriptive 






                                                     
30 We code 1 for months when the incumbent chief executives’ current terms end regardless of re-election.  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Independent and Control Variables 
 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Democracies (N = 17,272)         
Trends score (Political competence)  0.568 2.77 0 100 
High prestige 0.260 0.438 0 1 
Medium prestige 0.552 0.497 0 1 
Low prestige 0.189 0.391 0 1 
Education (Technical competence) 1.967 0.856 1 3 
Age 58.46 7.486 35 79 
Gender 0.136 0.342 0 1 
Parliamentary experience 4.761 7.859 0 41 
Scandal 0.010 0.099 0 1 
Government termination 0.037 0.189 0 1 
     
Autocracies (N = 6,534)     
Trends score (Political competence) 0.983 2.549 0 100 
High prestige 0.260 0.438 0 1 
Medium prestige 0.530 0.499 0 1 
Low prestige 0.211 0.408 0 1 
Education (Technical competence) 2.023 0.762 1 3 
Age 58.32 6.048 42 73 
Gender 0.069 0.254 0 1 
Parliamentary experience 9.668 8.005 0 34 
Scandal 0.011 0.105 0 1 
Government termination 0.021 0.142 0 1 
Note: Democracies include five countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines), and 




We test our hypotheses with a form of the Cox proportional-hazards model. Our 
dependent variable is the hazard rate of a minister's promotion, meaning the rate at which 
a minister is promoted at a given time, conditional on not yet experiencing promotion. 
The hazard rate of promotion is a latent variable – what we observe is a minister’s tenure 
in a given post, meaning the time until the minister is promoted or dismissed from the 
specific post. Proportional-hazards models are widely used to estimate the survival of 
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ministers and cabinets (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2007; Kam & Indriđason, 2005; 
Wood & Marchbanks III, 2007).  
However, their application to the estimation of the likelihood that a minister will 
be promoted conditional on public profiles is not straightforward because our measure of 
public profiles using the search index is a time-varying covariate during the observed 
time period for each minister. The time-series properties of the search data may cause 
complications, such as serial correlation (Mellon, 2014). Given the time-series cross-
sectional structure of our dataset at individual and country levels, we employ a variant of 
the survival-time model, called a random-effects parametric survival-time model with 
cluster-robust standard errors for individual-level panels nested within country. We 
therefore estimate standard errors that are robust to general forms of spatial and temporal 
dependence.  
 In classifying the ministers’ post-tenure occupations, we create four categories: 
retired or left for jobs outside politics; demoted to lower prestige cabinet posts or held 
other lower prestige government jobs; retained at the same-level cabinet or government 
posts; and re-allocated to higher prestige cabinet or government positions. Since whether 
a minister’s post-tenure occupation in politics brings more influence over policy and 
more access to power is an important standard for our definition of promotion, the only 
unambiguous promotion is the last category. That is, for ministers who held low prestige 
posts, they are promoted when they receive medium or higher prestige government posts. 
Likewise, for ministers who held medium prestige posts, they are promoted when they 
receive other higher prestige government positions. In the case of ministers who already 
received high prestige posts, there are still several government positions that are more 
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attractive and carry a higher rank than state cabinet positions. In democracies, chief 
executives, vice presidents, premiers, vice premiers, and party chairs belong to this 
category. In autocracies, on top of these same positions, a Politburo position and a 
Politburo Standing Committee position are prestigious ones for political elites.  
 Table 3 displays the proportion of ministers who were promoted from different 
types of ministerial positions and their average Trends scores in democracies and 
autocracies. Because the Trends scores are relative scales, they should be interpreted as 
the percentage of searches relative to the peak level of searches for the most-searched 
politician in the country. In practice, this means that the number is the average level of 
searches relative to the peak observation of searches for the country’s leader.  
In looking at the data, consistent with our theory, ministers in democracies 
winning promotion have higher profiles than those that do not for all levels of prestige. 
By contrast, in autocracies, ministers with high profiles only win promotion from low and 
medium prestige ministries. For high prestige ministries, promoted ministers have an 
average profile of 0.96 compared to 1.88 for those not winning promotion. This means 
that high prestige ministers winning promotion in autocracies actually have lower profiles 








Table 3. Ministerial Promotions and Average Trends Scores by Regime Type 
 








High Prestige Ministries    
N 20 205 14 23 
Proportion 8.9% 91.1% 37.8% 62.2% 
Average Profiles 2.89 1.27 0.96 1.88 
Total  225 (100%) 37 (100%) 
     
Medium Prestige Ministries   
N 35 423 17 67 
Proportion 7.6% 92.4% 20.2% 79.8% 
Average Profiles 1.77 1.05 1.83 0.79 
Total  458 (100%) 84 (100%) 
     
Low Prestige Ministries    
N 17 136 4 33 
Proportion 11.1% 88.9% 10.8% 89.2% 
Average Profiles 3.38 0.85 0.80 0.76 
Total  153 (100%) 37 (100%) 




The previous section presents descriptive statistics consistent with our theory. In this 
section, we disentangle the contribution of each factor – public profiles, ministry types, 
and ministers’ individual characteristics – upon ministers’ hazard rates. Tables 4 and 5 
present the impact of our key independent variables discussed above on ministers’ 
promotion probabilities in democracies and autocracies, respectively. Column 1 of Tables 
4 and 5 shows the results of the impact of ministers’ public profiles on their promotions 
in democracies and autocracies. Columns 2-4 of Tables 4 and 5 report the impact of 
ministers’ public profiles on their promotions, conditional on levels of prestige in cabinet  
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Table 4. The Determinants of Ministerial Promotions in Democracies: Hazard 
Ratios from Cox Models 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 General Low prestige Medium prestige High prestige 
Trends score 1.058*** 1.056*** 1.053*** 1.062*** 
(Political competence) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) 
High prestige 0.881 0.837 1.103  
 (0.324) (0.326) (0.339)  
Medium prestige 0.758 0.767  0.925 
 (0.247) (0.266)  (0.284) 
Low prestige   1.347 1.230 
   (0.470) (0.480) 
Trends x High  1.005 1.008  
  (0.012) (0.017)  
Trends x Medium  0.995  0.989 
  (0.021)  (0.020) 
Trends x Low   1.000 0.992 
   (0.018) (0.011) 
Education 0.948 0.947 0.945 0.944 
(Technical competence) (0.165) (0.164) (0.166) (0.164) 
Age 0.972* 0.972* 0.972* 0.972* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Gender 0.671 0.675 0.667 0.672 
 (0.299) (0.300) (0.301) (0.300) 
Parliamentary exp 1.030 1.031 1.030 1.030 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Scandal 0.932 0.972 0.960 0.970 
 (0.463) (0.500) (0.497) (0.502) 
Gov't termination 1.888** 1.892** 1.881* 1.892** 
 (0.606) (0.581) (0.639) (0.593) 
South Korea 1.194 1.204 1.191 1.208 
 (0.707) (0.712) (0.710) (0.715) 
Taiwan 1.754 1.775 1.751 1.776 








Table 4. The Determinants of Ministerial Promotions in Democracies: Hazard 
Ratios from Cox Models (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 General Low prestige Medium prestige High prestige 
Indonesia 0.944 0.952 0.943 0.951 
 (0.524) (0.525) (0.531) (0.526) 
Philippines 0.793 0.797 0.790 0.798 
 (0.533) (0.536) (0.537) (0.538) 
Wald χ2 152.96 171.26 166.30 175.86 
Prob > χ2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Failures (Promotions) 72 72 72 72 
Ministers & Countries 835 (5) 835 (5) 835 (5) 835 (5) 
Observations 17,272 17,272 17,272 17,272 
Notes: Baseline categories are a low prestige post in Models 1 and 2, a medium prestige post in Model 3, a 
high prestige post in Model 4, and Japan across all models. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
 
posts, in democracies and autocracies. In Cox proportional hazards models, a hazard ratio 
above one indicates a greater likelihood of being promoted as the value of the covariate 
increases, whereas hazard ratios below one mean ministers are less likely to be promoted.  
 The results of the models are consistent with our hypotheses. In Table 4, we find 
that a unit increase in Trends score leads to a 5.8 percent greater possibility of promotion 
for ministers in democracies. The magnitude of this hazard rate is consistent across all 
models in Table 4, indicating that ministers with higher public profiles are more likely to 
win promotion in democracies without regard to the level of prestige. Based on the 
estimates in column 1, an increase in a minister’s Trends score from its observed mean to 
two standard deviations above the mean values leads to a considerably greater possibility 
of promotion: from 3.3 percent to 41.1 percent. In Figure 1, we present three graphs 
showing the average probability of ministerial promotion in democracies, conditional on 
public profiles and ministry types, for each month of the distribution of time in office.  
 
 





Notes: Figures 1.1-1.3 are based on the estimation of columns 2-4 of Table 4, respectively. Given a left-skewed distribution of Trends scores, we present substantive 
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 Table 4 also reports the impact of individual attributes on ministers’ promotion 
probabilities in democracies. The variable for education background, as represented by 
the highest degree earned, is insignificant, confirming our prediction that educational 
backgrounds have no impact on the likelihood of a minister’s promotion in democracies. 
We further find that a minister’s age matters in ministerial promotions in democracies. 
Based on the estimation of column 1, an increase in a minister’s age by five years reduces 
the chance of promotion by 13 percent. In addition, we find that ministers whose tenure 
ends at the time of a government termination have a higher hazard rate than those 
replaced between government terminations. A good number of ministers lost their posts 
when no termination occurred, confirming that government terminations and minister 
terminations are distinct (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2012). 
 
Table 5. The Determinants of Ministerial Promotions in Autocracies: Hazard Ratios 
from Cox Models 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 General Low prestige Medium prestige High prestige 
Trends score 1.057** 1.338** 1.098*** 0.677** 
(Political competence) (0.024) (0.190) (0.030) (0.126) 
High prestige 0.348 2.565 0.724  
 (0.504) (3.573) (0.865)  
Medium prestige 1.654 3.543  1.382 
 (1.448) (3.597)  (1.652) 
Low prestige   0.282 0.390 
   (0.287) (0.543) 
Trends x High  0.506*** 0.617***  
  (0.103) (0.110)  
Trends x Medium  0.821  1.622*** 
  (0.115)  (0.289) 
Trends x Low   1.218 1.976*** 
   (0.170) (0.402) 
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Table 5. The Determinants of Ministerial Promotions in Autocracies: Hazard Ratios 
from Cox Models (Continued) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 General Low prestige Medium prestige High prestige 
Education 2.880** 2.446* 2.446* 2.446* 
(Technical competence) (1.523) (1.277) (1.277) (1.277) 
Age 1.010 1.004 1.004 1.004 
 (0.063) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
Gender 4.822 4.865 4.865 4.865 
 (5.296) (5.594) (5.594) (5.594) 
Parliament exp 1.237*** 1.234*** 1.234*** 1.234*** 
 (0.086) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Scandal 5.563** 4.967 4.967 4.967 
 (4.746) (5.422) (5.422) (5.422) 
Gov't termination 59.93*** 67.20*** 67.20*** 67.20*** 
 (38.57) (45.84) (45.84) (45.84) 
Vietnam 3.558 2.724 2.724 2.724 
 (4.270) (3.020) (3.020) (3.020) 
Malaysia 0.384 0.230 0.230 0.230 
 (0.549) (0.372) (0.372) (0.372) 
Singapore 13.10* 8.071 8.071 8.071 
 (17.46) (10.92) (10.92) (10.92) 
Wald χ2 255.14 286.18 286.20 286.20 
Prob > χ2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Failures (Promotions) 41 41 41 41 
Ministers & Countries 141 (4) 141 (4) 141 (4) 141 (4) 
Observations 6,175 6,175 6,175 6,175 
Notes: Baseline categories include a low prestige post in Models 1 and 2, a medium prestige post in Model 
3, a high prestige post in Model 4, and China across all models.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
 
 Turning to promotion patterns in autocracies, in column 1 of Table 5, we find that 
a unit increase in Trends score leads to a six percent higher hazard rate for ministers in 
autocracies. This finding indicates that ministers with higher public profiles are also more 
likely to win promotion in autocracies, holding all other variables constant. An increase 
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in a minister’s Trends score from its observed mean to two standard deviations above the 
mean values leads to an increase in the hazard rate of a minister by 36 percentage points.  
 However, consistent with Hypothesis 4, we find that public profiles interact with 
the prestige of the ministry. In columns 2-4 of Table 5, we condition on three levels of 
prestige in cabinet positions: low, medium, and high prestige posts. We find that an 
additional unit of Trends score decreases the chance of promotion for ministers in higher 
prestige ministries. For each additional unit increase in a minister’s Trends score, the 
likelihood of promotion for low prestige post holders increases by 34 percent. For 
medium prestige ministers, the benefit is 10 percent higher. However, for high prestige 
ministers, an increase in Trends scores decreases promotion prospects by 32 percent. 
This is clearly illustrated in three graphs of Figure 2 (2.1-2.3), which show the average 
probability of ministerial promotion in autocracies, conditional on public profiles and 
ministry types, for each month of the distribution of time in office. 
Based on the estimation of columns 2-4, an increase in a minister’s Trends score 
from its observed mean to two standard deviations above the mean values more than 
quadruples the chance of promotion for low prestige post holders, some 50 percentage 
points higher chance of promotion for medium prestige post holders, but some 59 points 
lower probability of promotion for high prestige post holders in autocracies. This is 
consistent with our theory that politically competent ministers in threatening positions are 









Notes: Figures 2.1-2.3 are based on the estimation of columns 2-4 of Table 5, respectively. Given a left-skewed distribution of Trends scores, we present substantive 
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 Table 5 also reports the impact of individual attributes on ministers’ promotion 
probabilities in autocracies. The variable for education, as we predicted, is a significant 
factor determining ministerial promotions in autocracies. Based on the estimate in 
column 1, a minister with a doctoral degree has a hazard rate 2.9 times higher than a 
minister with an average level of educational training (a master’s degree). In addition, 
two control variables in our models – parliamentary experience and government 
termination – are positive and statistically significant. With regard to a government 
termination, we find that ministers whose tenure ends at the time of a cabinet termination 
have a much higher hazard rate than those replaced between government terminations. In 




In this section, we test the sensitivity of our results to a range of alternative specifications 
and report them in the appendix. One concern is that our results do not take into account 
the important distinctions between presidential and parliamentary systems in democracies. 
In particular, it is possible our model only applies to Japan, the one parliamentary 
democracy in our sample. To address this concern, in columns 1-2 of Table A2, we 
estimate two separate models for presidential and parliamentary systems. Although the 
results are weaker for the presidential systems, Table A2 shows that our results are robust 
to the differences within democracies.31  
                                                     
31  Due to a limited number of promoted ministers in each prestige level of cabinet positions within 
countries, we only show models without interaction terms. 
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 The other potential cause for concern is censorship of Internet search data 
occurring in some authoritarian countries. China, for example, engages in massive efforts 
to suppress online communication (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2014). This could jeopardize 
our findings if those that are most well-known are censored, therefore artificially 
reducing the number of searches for those ministers. To address this concern, we 
demonstrate that our results in autocracies presented in the previous section are robust to 
the exclusion of China and after controlling for levels of press freedom.32 The results in 
Table A3 confirm the findings. 
 In addition, we employ a different specification of Cox proportional hazards 
models to address country-level heterogeneity. Although we address potential diversity 
across countries by including country-level fixed effects, we further address macro-level 
heteroskedasticity by estimating separate models for democracies and autocracies 
accounting for country-level factors in Tables A4 and A5.33 As Tables A4 and A5 show, 
the results confirm the robustness of our findings.  
An additional question is whether the coefficients on Trends scores in 
democracies and autocracies are statistically different from each other. In our main 
analysis, we chose to run separate models for different regime types with country-level 
fixed effects rather than consolidated models with triple interaction terms. The reason is 
simple: Our measure of a minister’s public profile (i.e. Trends score) is a relative score 
for each minister calculated in comparison with the highest searched political leader 
within the country. Therefore, ministers who had average scores of 10 in democracies 
                                                     
32  The source of information on levels of press freedom is from the Corruption Perceptions Index. 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017. Last Accessed April 17, 
2018.  
33 The source of information on levels of human development is from the Human Development Index. 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. Last Accessed April 17, 2018.  
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and autocracies do not necessarily show the same levels of public profile. Yet, as an 
additional analysis, we estimate consolidated models for all nine East Asian countries and 
confirm that the results are overall consistent to our findings from main models 
separately run for democracies and autocracies.  
A final question is which countries drive the findings for autocracies. In particular, 
are electoral autocracies (Malaysia and Singapore) different from closed autocracies 
(China and Vietnam)? Unfortunately, due to the limited number of promotions within 
countries, the degrees of freedom shrink when we run a disaggregated analysis. However, 
a pared down analysis in Table A6 shows that the results on the key variables are stable 
across the two regime types. However, we regard these results as speculative and an 
important area for future research.  
   
Conclusion  
Returning to our theory, the results suggest that political competence is important for 
promotion in democracies but is less so in autocracies. Technical competence, by contrast, 
is paramount in autocracy. Our evidence is consistent with anecdotal accounts of changes 
in ministerial promotion patterns in South Korea and Indonesia pre- and post-
democratization. In sum, our findings corroborate our theory.  
Does this theory apply outside of East Asia? Although the “China Model” gains 
the most attention in East Asia, we believe our model should generalize to other regions. 
Indeed, in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe’s successor Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was 
promoted several times by Mugabe, has been described as the “antithesis of charismatic, 
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articulate Mugabe…”34 Similarly, Dmitry Medvedev, who was promoted by Vladimir 
Putin to succeed him as president in 2008, was similarly viewed as colorless prior to his 
election.35 In democracies, however, politicians that draw attention often manage to rise. 
Enrique Pena Nieto, who was already described as “high profile” as early as 2008, 
managed to win the nomination for the presidential election in 2011.36  
What does this mean for the debate regarding the validity of a “China Model”? 
On one hand, it validates some of the claims made by proponents of the China Model. In 
particular, our findings suggest that autocracies may be less susceptible to promoting 
demagogues and may in fact promote meritorious leaders (Bell, 2015). At the same time, 
we should caution that politically competent leaders may be important for regime 
legitimacy, accountability, and policy making. While demagogues may certainly be 
politically competent, political competence can also involve promoting new policies and 
engaging with citizens. If such competent ministers are routinely sidelined in autocracies, 
this could provide an explanation for why stable autocracies can atrophy over time 
(Roeder, 1995). Without ministers capable of exciting the public, citizens may tune out of 
politics entirely rendering the regime weak and out of touch if crisis hits. The long-term 
effects of such patterns remain as a central question for future research.  
A final point is that our findings pertain to patterns of promotion for ministers 
after they are appointed. In terms of the overall composition of the cabinet, our data show 
some interesting patterns worth future research: the democracy-autocracy distinction is 
not of primary importance for the overall technical competence of the cabinet. With that 
                                                     
34  See Quist-Arcton, Ofeibea. “Who is Zimbabwe’s New Leader, Emmerson Mnangagwa?” NPR. 
November 23, 2017.   
35 See Blomfield, Adrian. “Putin Backs Dmitry Medvedev as his Successor.” The Telegraph. December 10, 
2007.  
36 Wilkinson, Tracy. “Killing of Mexico Mayor Sends a Message.” LA Times. October 8, 2008.  
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said, our findings provide strong evidence that once appointed, democracies incentivize 
greater political competence than is the case in autocracies for the highest prestige 
cabinet positions. Indeed, as Hallerberg and Wehner (2018) note, Barack Obama’s staff 
had to hone Timothy Geithner’s political skills after being selected as Treasury Secretary. 
This suggests that while he may have been chosen for his experience, political 
competence was a necessary skill once selected. 
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